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Abstract
Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of
mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Propo-
nents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend
beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project
of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have
deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, I in-
vestigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant
non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict.
Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical
objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform meta-
physics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on
these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead.
Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of
mathematical objects, such as sets of sentences (understood as syntactic strings), or sets of math-
ematical models, or categories of mathematical models (in the sense of category theory). Philoso-
phers of science working on such criteria first associate different physical theories with some such
mathematical objects. They then use theorems about which of these mathematical objects stand
in one of these mathematical mappings to each other in order to draw conclusions about which
physical theories are (or fail to be) “theoretically equivalent”.
These formal approaches to theoretical equivalence have been around for a while, but there has
been something of an explosion of work on them over the past decade.1 I take the mathematical
fruits of this work to be unassailable (results to the effect that such-and-such mathematical objects
1For a sampling see Barrett (2015, 2019), Barrett & Halvorson (2016a,b, 2017), Butterfield (2018), Curiel (2014), Coffey
(2014), Glymour (2013), Halvorson (2012, 2013), Hudetz (2019), North (2009), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Teh & Tsementzis
(2017), Tsementzis (2017), and Weatherall (2015). For some older work on the topic see Glymour (1970, 1977), Quine
(1975), Sklar (1982), and Putnam (1983). For a helpful overview of the literature see Weatherall (2019). There has
also been a burgeoning interest in the related topic of dualities. Much of what I will say also bears on this topic.
However, discussing dualities explicitly would require another paper, so I shall confine my attention here to theoretical
equivalence.
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do or do not stand in such-and-such mathematical relation). However, those working on formal
criteria take their results to have significant implications that go beyond pure mathematics. For
instance, they take their results to bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as
a guide to what the world is like, and also to have deflationary implications for various debates
in the metaphysics of physics. And, without question, the interest of work on formal criteria
would be diminished if formal equivalence results were conceded to lack such non-mathematical
implications. But it has yet to be made clear precisely what these non-mathematical implications
might be, and how they are supposed to follow from a formal equivalence result. My primary goal
here is to argue that the prospects for filling in this story are dim. I will investigate various views
one might hold about the non-mathematical significance of these formal criteria, and argue that
none is tenable. My tentative conclusion is that formal criteria are of limited non-mathematical
interest.
Along the way, I shall discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathe-
matical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform
metaphysics. I will suggest that the prominence and allure of formal criteria rests on certain con-
tentious assumptions about these foundational issues, and will endeavor to motivate some alter-
native views in their stead (see especially section 6). To preview, formal equivalence proofs by
their nature consider only the mathematics we use to express our best physics. Yet more than just
this mathematics contributes to the conceptions of reality inspired by contemporary physics. It is
no surprise that criteria of equivalence that ignore these additional components are inadequate in
important respects. The foundational assumptions that I shall challenge are quite prevalent in the
metaphysics of physics and the philosophy of science more generally. So even those unconcerned
with the topic of theoretical equivalence should still find material of interest in what follows.
1 Preliminaries
Let us start with a bit of background about theoretical equivalence generally, and and an example
of a formal criterion of equivalence.
1.1 Semantic Equivalence and Deflationary Strategies
There are several things you might be interested in when asking whether two theories are equiv-
alent, and there is little sense in fighting over which “really” deserves to be labeled ‘equivalence’.
In particular, someone might just be interested in whether the two theories are empirically equiv-
alent, or are formulated using mathematical structures that stand in a certain purely mathematical
relation, and choose to call the theories ‘equivalent’ as a result. I have no objection to them doing
so; I am not interested in fighting over the word.
That being said, the sense of equivalence I have in mind throughout is the one philosophers
of science are generally interested in, namely whether two theories say the same thing about the
world, or have the same semantic content, or the same interpretation, or express the same proposi-
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tion. (I will understand all of these glosses to amount to the same thing; more on this in a moment.)
The crucial contrast is that a mathematical object, such as a set or category of mathematical mod-
els, is on its own just a piece of mathematics, which does not represent the world as being any way
whatsoever. However, such objects are amongst the tools we use to represent the world, and in
doing so we bring about an association of the objects with some propositional content, depending
on what we are using the mathematics to represent. To avoid terminological issues about what in
fact suffices for “equivalence,” let us henceforth say that two mathematical objects that are being
used to say the same thing about the world (or have the same content, and so on) are semantically
equivalent. Note, we shall soon see that all of these glosses can never be understood absolutely;
after all, one and the same sentence or mathematical object can be used to say different things
about the world on different occasions. I will ignore this point for the time being, but we will see
its importance in due course.
You might immediately worry that there are large debates about the nature and fineness of
grain of propositions or contents themselves. For instance, do sentences used to express meta-
physically necessarily equivalent propositions say the same or different things about the world?
Fortunately, we do not need to get embroiled in such controversies. My goal here is to challenge
whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria illuminate when two theo-
ries say the same thing about the world. And my arguments apply even on very weak or coarse-
grained construals of what this requires, which are maximally hospitable to proponents of formal
criteria. For instance, my arguments will show that formal criteria fail even to secure metaphys-
ically necessary equivalence. Indeed some of my arguments point to cases where formal criteria
do not even imply material equivalence (having the same truth value). Thus those who hold
quite fine-grained views about propositions or semantic content can substitute various weaker re-
lations in place of my talk of semantic equivalence throughout without affecting the cogency my
arguments: relations like expressing mutually entailing propositions, expressing metaphysically
necessarily equivalent propositions, and so on. I shall stick with the imperfect label ‘semantic
equivalence’, though it should be understood in a liberal sense throughout compatible with very
coarse-grained accounts of what saying the same thing about the world involves.2
Like ‘equivalence’, the word ‘theory’ often leads to terminological confusion. At times ‘the-
ory’ is used to describe certain uninterpreted mathematical objects (for instance, a certain solution
space satisfying some equations). At other times, the word describes this mathematics together
with an interpretation; that is, the mathematical object plus some associated semantic content en-
coding a way the world might be. Quite often interpreting certain claims involving the word
‘theory’ requires one to shift between these two senses. The former sense is the one generally
operative in discussions of semantic equivalence; the issue under debate is precisely which unin-
terpreted mathematical objects have the same interpretation. To avoid terminological confusion,
2No label here is perfect, but I have found ‘semantic equivalence’ to be the least misleading. Another option would
be ‘worldly equivalence’. Other labels one finds in the literature for the target phenomenon include ‘metaphysical
equivalence’, ‘full equivalence’, ‘interpretational equivalence’, and ‘representational equivalence’. Readers should feel
free to substitute whichever label they prefer throughout.
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I will generally avoid the word ‘theory’ unless it is unambiguous what sense I intend. I will use
‘representational vehicle’ to describe an uninterpreted object that might come to have an interpre-
tation (express a proposition, have content, and so on). So representational vehicles include un-
interpreted strings in a formal or natural language, and also uninterpreted mathematical objects
like a set or category of mathematical models. In this terminology, formal criteria of equivalence
are mappings between certain representational vehicles.3
Why have philosophers of science been interested in semantic equivalence? Discoveries about
which representational vehicles are semantically equivalent enable one to collapse certain distinc-
tions. If such discoveries are non-obvious, then the result of semantic equivalence may enable
one to diagnose some extant debate as misguided. Suppose two philosophers are debating about
the fundamental metaphysics of the world. The former expresses her view with representational
vehicle A, and the latter with vehicle B. Then if you could show A and B to be semantically equiv-
alent, you would have thereby deflated the debate, by showing that the philosophers have not
succeeded in articulating a contentful difference to be disagreeing over. For instance, suppose A
and B are identical sentences except for being written in different fonts. Given standard represen-
tational conventions, we do not take our choice of font in writing sentences down to change their
semantic content.4 Hence, A and B are plausibly semantically equivalent on standard occasions
of use, and any appearance of a substantive disagreement between A-advocates and B-advocates
is illusory. Notice that this sort of criticism is much stronger than the common complaint that
some debate is epistemically intractable: deflating a debate via semantic equivalence reveals that
the participants have failed to even carve out a meaningful distinction to disagree over in the first
place. Now disagreements where the parties employ representational vehicles that differ only
over their fonts will never arise in practice, so an equivalence-based deflationary strategy must
employ non-obvious results about which representational vehicles are semantically equivalent.
The classic version of such a strategy was logical positivism, which took “empirical equiva-
lence” to suffice for semantic equivalence. Positivists thus purported to deflate debates framed in
terms of representational vehicles used to express empirically equivalent contents. Indeed, they
regarded such debates as no more sensible than debates framed in terms of representational vehi-
cles differing only over their fonts. Generally the vehicles appeared to be expressing contentful,
3I should flag that I think there are problems with lumping sentences together with mathematical objects in this
way. In particular, I am skeptical of the common practice of treating mathematical objects as things that, like sentences,
might be or fail to be semantically equivalent to one another. When we use a sentence to describe the non-mathematical
world, we do so by using it to express some proposition or content. By contrast, when we use a mathematical object
like a set of mathematical models to describe the non-mathematical world, we do say by saying something about that
object and the non-mathematical world, usually highlighting some salient respect in which the two are similar. There
is little sense in asking, even on some particular occasion of use, what a mathematical model “says about the non-
mathematical world”; rather, it is similar in certain respects and different in others. Some of my skepticism about this
contrast will crop up below, but I will try to set it aside as much as possible, and acquiesce in the standard practice
of treating mathematical objects as things that may be semantically equivalent to one another. Doing so allows me to
focus on my concerns about formal criteria of equivalence in particular.
4Choice of font might affect the truth of certain token sentences given standard representational conventions (con-
sider ‘this sentence is written in Times New Roman’). However, the issue in the main text concerns the bearing of font
choice on the proposition expressed.
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albeit empirically inaccessible, differences (for instance, differing over whether they imply that
space is infinite). However, for the positivists such appearances were illusory. The doctrines at
issue in most philosophical debates do not differ over their empirical consequences; as a result, if
the positivists were correct, we would have had reason to consign most philosophical debates to
the flames.
Nowadays the positivist program is rightly regarded as a dramatic failure, resting on dubious
assumptions across metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language.5 However, this
deflationary strategy illustrates why semantic equivalence is usually the sense of ‘equivalence’
that philosophers of science are interested in, particularly those set on discrediting metaphysical
inquiry (again, always keeping in the mind our weak use of ‘semantic equivalence’ emphasized
above). For semantic equivalence is what must be at issue if some debate is to be deflated via
assimilation to the debate between representational vehicles differing only over their fonts. We
shall see that proponents of formal criteria see their results as implying neo-positivist deflationary
conclusions about certain extant debates amongst metaphysics-oriented philosophers of physics,
such as the debate over whether there are spacetime points. And my sense is that many take
work on formal criteria to cast doubt on these more metaphysics-oriented debates. Yet these de-
flationary conclusions follow only if formal criteria illuminate semantic equivalence, which I shall
challenge here.
1.2 An Example: Definitional Equivalence
My arguments will generally concern the idea of a formal criterion of theoretical equivalence in the
abstract. Hence, for the most part we need not delve into the details of particular criteria on offer.
Nonetheless, it will be helpful to give you a feel for one of the criteria, so you have an example in
mind moving forward. The criteria can helpfully be grouped into two broad categories: sentential
and non-sentential. Sentential criteria relate logical theories, understood as sets of (uninterpreted)
sentences of some formal language. Non-sentential criteria relate non-sentential representational
vehicles, such as categories of mathematical models.
Let us start with the sentential criterion of definitional equivalence, first introduced into the phi-
losophy of science by Glymour (1970, 1977). The criterion relates theories in first-order languages.
Any two such theories that are formulated in different signatures (primitive vocabularies) cannot
be logically equivalent. Definitional equivalence is meant to capture the intuition that neverthe-
less such theories might have the same expressive resources. Here is the rough idea.6 Let Σ and
Σ+ be first-order signatures such that Σ ⊆ Σ+. Given a first-order theory T in Σ, we can define the
definitional extension of T to Σ+. This is a first-order theory T+ in Σ+ that extends T by adding ex-
5See Soames (2003, ch.12-13) for an overview of some reasons for the fall of positivism. In the main text I described
the standard characterization of the positivist program, and my comments are directed at the program only understood
in this way (according to which it is committed to a flat-footed empiricist criterion of semantic content). An anonymous
referee points out that some commentators argue that the positivists in fact held more sophisticated and defensible
views than the standard characterization would suggest. For discussion, see Friedman (1999) and Creath (2020).
6See Barrett & Halvorson (2016a) for a rigorous presentation.
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plicit definitions of all vocabulary in Σ+ \Σ in terms of the vocabulary in Σ. For example, let F and
G be monadic predicate constants, and suppose Σ = {F} and Σ+ = {F, G}. Then, a definitional
extension T+ might extend T by adding the explicit definition ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx). Now, consider any
first-order theories T1 in signature Σ1 and T2 in signature Σ2. We say T1 and T2 are definitionally
equivalent iff there is a definitional extension T+1 of T1 to the signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2, and a definitional




2 are logically equivalent. In
a slogan, definitionally equivalent theories have a “common definitional extension”.
To side-step having to axiomatize realistic physics in a first-order language, Glymour instead
works with a model-theoretic analogue of definitional equivalence. Though, as emphasized by
Weatherall (2015, 1079-80), the analogue employs the notion of elements of one model being
“uniquely and covariantly definable” in terms of the elements of the other, and the need for first-
order formulations recurs in trying to make this notion precise.7 This point provides perhaps the
central explanation for the recent prominence of non-sentential criteria, in particular a category-
theoretic criterion, amongst philosophers of science working on equivalence. We shall discuss this
criterion later on.
Let us turn now to our main task of exploring the views one might hold about the non-
mathematical significance of a formal criterion of theoretical equivalence.
2 Trivial Semantic Conventionality
Here is a natural first-pass view for the proponent of a formal criterion who wants to argue that
it has some bearing on semantic equivalence: the criterion straightforwardly “tells us which rep-
resentational vehicles are semantically equivalent to which others.” But, as adumbrated above,
any claim of this sort cannot be correct, because of the familiar platitude that any representational
vehicle can in principle be used to represent the world as being just about any way whatsoever
(what Putnam (1983, 41) calls trivial semantic conventionality). For example, we generally use the
(uninterpreted) sentence ‘all dogs have fleas’ to say that all dogs have fleas, however there is
nothing incoherent about a community that uses that very same sentence to instead say that all
philosophers have fleas. Similarly, we noted above that generally we use representational vehi-
cles differing only over their fonts to express the same semantic content, which motivated the
claim that such vehicles are semantically equivalent. However, there is nothing incoherent about
a community that uses English sentences exactly the way we do with the exception that writing a
sentence in a particular font is a way of negating it.
The platitude of trivial semantic conventionality shows that it does not make sense to ask what
a representational vehicle says about the world simpliciter (or its interpretation simpliciter, or its
semantic content simpliciter, and so on). As a result, trivial semantic conventionality shows that
7Notably, as Weatherall appreciates, for Glymour’s purposes the need for first-order formulations does not arise.
We shall see that he regarded definitional equivalence only as a necessary condition for semantic equivalence, and, in
the cases he was interested in, the “uniqueness” clause sufficed for his results (which concerned verdicts about only
inequivalence).
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it also does not make sense to ask which representational vehicles are semantically equivalent
simpliciter. Rather, such questions must be relativized, whether to interpretations or occasions of
use (where interpretations are mappings from representational vehicles to contents, and different
interpretations can be operative on different occasions of use). Thus formal criteria of equivalence
between two representational vehicles A and B cannot tell us something about the semantic prop-
erties of A and B simpliciter, absent information about how A and B are being used to represent
the world. Moreover, we should not ask whether two representational vehicles are semantically
equivalent relative to every interpretation: we know from trivial semantic conventionality that no
representational vehicles are semantically equivalent relative to every interpretation. Similarly,
we should not ask merely whether two representational vehicles are semantically equivalent rela-
tive to some interpretation: again from trivial semantic conventionality, we know that every pair of
representational vehicles is trivially semantically equivalent relative to some interpretation. Thus,
in light of trivial semantic conventionality, the question facing proponents of a formal criterion is
whether there is some interesting range of interpretations relative to which the criterion illumi-
nates semantic equivalence.
Notice that the platitude and attendant moral are not peculiar to sentences, but hold true
of representational vehicles generally. For instance, a common example that motivates seman-
tic equivalence for non-sentential representational vehicles (analogous to choice of font) involves
the choice of signature when writing down a general relativistic theory. Consider two general
relativistic solution spaces (understood as sets of uninterpreted mathematical models) that differ
only over the choice of a Lorentzian metric of signature (1, 3) rather than of signature (3, 1) in each
solution. Analogously to how we generally do not take our choice of font when writing a sentence
down to affect its propositional content, the choice between these solution spaces (which are dis-
tinct mathematical objects) is universally regarded as a mere sign convention that does not affect
semantic content (roughly, the convention of whether to associate time-like distances with positive
numbers and space-like distances with negative numbers, or the other way around). A moral one
might be tempted to draw is that the two solution spaces “are semantically equivalent,” because
they “say the same thing about the world,” but we now see that these glosses cannot strictly hold
without qualification. Just as there is nothing incoherent about a community that allows choice of
font to make a contentful difference, there is nothing incoherent about a community that does the
same for choice of signature. For example, consider a community, call them the “+sitivists” (bad
pun), where it is ingrained in their applied mathematical practice that only positive numbers in a
Lorentzian metric correspond to time-like vectors, and only negative numbers in the metric corre-
spond to space-like vectors. Thus, in this community, the solution space where each solution has
a metric of signature (1, 3) might be used to represent the world as containing a familiar general
relativistic spacetime (with its one time-like and three space-like directions at every point). By con-
trast, they take the (3, 1) solution space to correspond to the (perhaps metaphysically impossible)
proposition that at every spacetime point there are three mutually orthogonal time-like directions
and no two orthogonal space-like directions. This community’s representational conventions are
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alien to our own, but they are perfectly coherent. We see then that the moral from trivial seman-
tic conventionality extends to all representational vehicles, including mathematical objects like
a solution space. On their own such objects are just mathematics, which do not “say anything
about the world,” or have any “interpretation,” and so on. Hence, any talk about whether such
objects are semantically equivalent must be understood relative to some operative interpretation
or particular occasions of use. Finally, notice that the reasoning that led to this conclusion applies
irrespective of how syntactically or structurally similar or different the mathematical objects at
issue may be.
It likely seems as though I am belaboring the obvious, but this moral reveals that most extant
glosses on the non-mathematical significance of formal criteria cannot be taken at face-value. For
example, a standard gloss is that formal criteria holding between two representational vehicles
reveal that the vehicles have “the same capacities to represent physical situations” (this gloss on
the non-mathematical significance of the popular category-theoretic criterion of equivalence is re-
peated by Weatherall (2015, p1081, p1087) and Rosenstock, Barrett, and Weatherall (2015, 315);
compare also Hudetz (2019, 52-53)). But, on the most straightforward reading of these glosses,
all representational vehicles considered on their own have the same “capacities to represent phys-
ical situations,” simply due to trivial semantic conventionality: namely, the capacity to represent
just about any physical situation whatsoever. So such glosses must not be meant at face-value.
But we shall see in section 5 that it is unclear what precisification of such glosses might serve the
purposes of proponents of formal criteria. Similarly, Rosenstock, Barrett, and Weatherall (2015,
315-16) claim that because their category-theoretic criterion holds between two representational
vehicles, the vehicles “encode precisely the same physical facts about the world, in somewhat
different languages.” But this gloss does not do any better. As I have emphasized, no represen-
tational vehicle, whether a sentence or a mathematical object, encodes any facts about the world
simpliciter. One more: Barrett (2019, pp.1188-1192) argues for a connection between which of our
theories satisfy some formal criterion of equivalence and which “features of our theories are signif-
icant or contentful.” But the “theories” at issue in his discussion are uninterpreted mathematical
objects drawn from mathematical physics; and again, no features of such uninterpreted theories
are significant or contentful full-stop.
The moral in this section is a different route towards the moral emphasized by all extant crit-
icisms of formal criteria. Here I have in mind the investigations of Sklar (1982), Coffey (2014),
Nguyen (2017), and Butterfield (2018) (see also Putnam (1983, 38) and van Fraassen (2014)). These
criticisms rightly point out, from different directions and using different examples, that we can,
and often do, use one and the same mathematical object in different ways on different occasions.
For example, in the literature on the metaphysics of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, flash and
matter-density conceptions of the world are presented with the aid of one and the same stochastic
collapse mathematical formulation of a quantum theory, such as the GRW theory.8 Because of
8Compare also van Fraassen (2014, 279): “If the same diffusion equation is presented to describe gas diffusion and,
elsewhere, temperature distribution over time, would anyone think that one and only one theory was being presented?
[...] A representation has content. A representation of gas diffusion is not the same thing as a representation of tem-
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this point, these critiques rightly conclude that no purely formal relation can illuminate semantic
equivalence absolutely; rather, a relation can do so only if it is sensitive to the interpretation or
semantic content being associated with the representational vehicles at issue.
I am very sympathetic with all of these critiques as far as they go. However, I think we can go
considerably further. Indeed, despite these criticisms work on formal criteria of equivalence has
not let up, and I think there are a few reasons for this. First, taking on board the need for rela-
tivization does not scotch the attempt to provide a rationale for the non-mathematical significance
of formal criteria; as noted above, for all we have said so far the criteria may correlate with seman-
tic equivalence relative to some important but circumscribed range of interpretations or occasions
of use. I think we can also cast doubt on such scaled-back ambitions for the non-mathematical
significance of formal criteria, as I shall attempt to do in the rest of the paper. Second, as Weather-
all (2019) emphasizes when responding to the critiques just mentioned, what I have been calling
‘formal criteria of equivalence’ thus far are often presented as being sufficient for equivalence only
when conjoined with empirical equivalence.9 And as I have just been emphasizing, it makes no
sense to talk about the “empirical content” or “observational content” of a representational vehicle
like a set or category of models in the abstract, despite the prominence of this way of speaking.
Such vehicles on their own have no content whatsoever, whether empirical or extra-empirical.
Thus arguably proponents of formal criteria have never meant to be propounding purely formal
criteria for equivalence, which apply to representational vehicles in the abstract, but rather criteria
which apply only to such vehicles together with an interpretation. Taking this moral on board, let
us ask whether there is a tenable scaled-back view according to which these criteria have non-
mathematical significance. (Note, I shall continue to use the label ‘formal criteria of equivalence’,
though I will be explicit about the role of empirical equivalence when it is relevant.)
3 Sentential Criteria
Let me start by discussing sentential criteria. I think there are clear counterexamples to any view
that regards such criteria as illuminating semantic equivalence, even relative to some circum-
scribed range of interesting interpretations. The reason is that such criteria are manifestly ex-
tensionally inadequate relative to any interpretations we in fact employ: indeed the criteria fail
even to imply material equivalence relative these interpretations. Yet these interpretations include
the ones operative when philosophers say things like ‘there are spacetime points’, or engage in
other metaphysical speculation. So I take this result to cast doubt on there being any defensible
and interesting view according to which sentential criteria have non-mathematical significance.
After defending these claims, I shall devote the rest of the paper to non-sentential (in particular
perature distribution, even if the math is the same.” Though because this example involves empirically inequivalent
contents, it will likely not worry proponents of formal criteria, for reasons I outline below in the main text.
9Those who have explicitly conceived of formal criteria of equivalence as ways to strengthen empirical equivalence




The kind of counterexample I have in mind has been forcefully presented by Sklar (and bracket
the point just mentioned about empirical equivalence for a moment):
Let the two theories be ‘All lions have stripes’, and ‘All tigers have stripes’, with all
the words in both theories taking on their usual meanings. The theories are inter-
translatable in the purely formal sense. They are exactly alike in logical form and one
can be obtained from the other by a simple term for term substitution. But they are
most assuredly not equivalent [...] mere commonality of logical form, even of a total
theory when compared with another total theory, is certainly not by itself sufficient for
theoretical equivalence. The meanings of the terms in the theories, however construed,
are crucial to questions of equivalence. (1982, 93)
The natural regimentations of Sklar’s single-sentence theories into first-order logic are deemed
equivalent by every extant sentential criterion that I am aware of. In particular, the theories are
deemed equivalent according to (i) Glymour’s (1970; 1977) criterion of definitional equivalence,
which I outlined above, (ii) a recent generalization of definitional equivalence called “Morita
equivalence” due to Barrett & Halvorson (2016b), (iii) Quine’s (1975) criterion in terms of inter-
translatability, and (iv) the generalization of Quine’s criterion spelled out by Barrett & Halvorson
(2016a), which like Morita equivalence turns out to be implied by definitional equivalence. Yet
the two sentences relative to their operative interpretation are not semantically equivalent; indeed
they are also not necessarily equivalent, nor even materially equivalent. And it is easy to multiply
examples of this sort indefinitely. If these counterexamples succeed, they reveal sentential criteria
to be woefully extensionally inadequate relative to the interpretations we in fact employ. In the
rest of this section, I shall argue that this deceptively simple challenge stands up to scrutiny: all
replies on behalf of proponents of formal criteria are problematic.
A first reply to these counterexamples appeals to the point mentioned above, that formal cri-
teria are generally intended to strengthen empirical equivalence (recall footnote 9). As applied to
Sklar’s example, the idea would be that although the regimentations of ‘all lions have stripes’ and
‘all tigers have stripes’ satisfy the various sentential criteria, these criteria are sufficient for seman-
tic equivalence only relative to interpretations where the sentences express empirically equivalent
contents. Yet on the relevant interpretations the two sentences fail this test.
An initial challenge for this reply are the familiar issues that arise for all views that place
considerable theoretical significance on the distinction between what is and is not observable, of
the sort that plagued positivists. For instance, what is observable, and hence what is empirically
equivalent to what, seems vague and to vary as our experimental capacities advance (for classic
discussions see Maxwell (1962) and van Fraassen (1980)). Any view tied to the distinction will
then seem to inherit these features. That being said, I do not want to delve into these large and
thorny issues here; the present reply fails even setting such issues aside.
The central problem with this reply is that it either threatens to collapse into the discredited
positivist criteria for semantic equivalence, or else does not address the issue that the counterex-
amples bring out. Proponents of formal criteria should (and generally explicitly do) allow for
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some contentful distinctions that cut finer than empirical equivalence.10 Doing so allows them to
avoid dubious claims to the effect that there is no intelligible distinction between, say, Lorentzian
and Minkowskian conceptions of special relativity, or between ascribing to the world a Newtonian
versus neo-Newtonian spacetime structure (which differ over whether there is a standard of ab-
solute velocity). Yet once proponents of formal criteria allow for some intelligible distinctions that
cannot be teased apart empirically, we can resuscitate Sklar-style counterexamples. For we can
now find sentences which, on the operative interpretation, (i) are not semantically equivalent, (ii)
have the requisite syntactic similarity to satisfy every extant sentential criteria, yet which (iii) are
also empirically equivalent. For example, consider a world with a Newtonian spacetime structure.
Suppose on some occasion one person in this world says ‘the centre of mass of the universe is mov-
ing at an absolute speed of 1m/s’ and a second says ‘the centre of mass of the universe is moving
at an absolute speed of 2m/s’, where both parties intend to be using standard English representa-
tional conventions. The two sentences are used to say different things about the Newtonian world
despite being empirically equivalent. Yet, exactly like Sklar’s original example, the sentences’ reg-
imentations into first-order logic will satisfy every extant sentential criterion of equivalence. Thus
it looks like supplementing sentential criteria with empirical equivalence simply fails to get to the
heart of the problem posed by the counterexamples.
A second potential reply to the counterexamples appeals to semantic holism, claiming that
we cannot consider single-sentence theories like Sklar’s, but must instead consider the speaker’s,
or perhaps the entire linguistic community’s, total “background theory” of the expressions that
figure in the relevant single-sentence theories (expressions like ‘lion’, ‘tiger’, or ‘moving at an
absolute speed of 1m/s’). For example, in the original case such a “background theory” might
include the sentence ‘nothing is both a lion and a tiger’. Yet the theory of this sentence and ‘all
lions have stripes’ fails to be definitionally equivalent to the theory consisting of the sentence
and ‘all tigers have stripes’ (because the theories have the same signature yet are not logically
equivalent).
This reply is untenable, however. A first issue is that holistic metasemantic theories are now
widely rejected (see Soames (2003, ch.17) for discussion of some of the worries these holistic the-
ories face). But even if we set that point aside, there is a straightforward problem with this reply:
no extant formal equivalence proofs consider total theories of this sort, and it is dubious that such
a theory could ever be written down in practice. Rather, such proofs generally consider standard
mathematical formulations of our best physical theories. And as I hinted at in the introduction,
and will expand on in section 6, these standard formulations are plausibly further embellished by
the user’s or community’s “background theory” of concepts like space, time, or mass.11 Thus I
doubt proponents of formal equivalence proofs would opt for this holistic reply, on pain of having
to abandon their entire project.
A third reply would be to claim that the formal criteria (perhaps supplemented with empirical
10For a recent example see Barrett (2019, p.1191). Compare also Putnam (1983, 30).
11And the same would be true even of candidates for what physicists sometimes describe as a “total,” “complete,”
or “final” theory, such as string theory or some other candidate theory of quantum gravity.
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equivalence) are intended only as necessary conditions for semantic equivalence. Indeed, Gly-
mour himself originally put forward definitional equivalence only as a necessary condition, given
that for his purposes he sought a verdict only about which representational vehicles fail to be
semantically equivalent. However, it is hard to see how this reply can be accepted by contem-
porary proponents of formal criteria. Those in this literature spend much of their time proving
positive results. Moreover, these positive results are what is needed in order to implement an
equivalence-based deflationary strategy. Relegating formal criteria to mere necessary conditions
makes it mysterious why such considerable energy has been exerted on these positive results.
Proponents of formal criteria will likely respond by extending the third reply as follows:
although formal criteria (perhaps supplemented with empirical equivalence) are merely neces-
sary conditions for semantic equivalence, they together with empirical equivalence form a non-
redundant component of some informative sufficient condition for semantic equivalence, which
rationalizes the extensive focus on proving positive results. The tenability of this reply depends
on what exactly is taken to be sufficient for semantic equivalence only when conjoined with a for-
mal equivalence result plus empirical equivalence. In the abstract, my objection is that either this
extra ingredient will be objectionable on independent grounds, or else render the formal equiva-
lence result a redundant idle-wheel. Let us see how this dilemma plays out with some particular
instances of this strategy.
For example, proponents of formal criteria cannot just declare some formal criterion sufficient
for semantic equivalence relative to some interpretation when the theories at issue also have the
same content relative to that interpretation. That amounts to saying that a formal equivalence re-
sult conjoined with semantic equivalence is sufficient for semantic equivalence: the formal equiv-
alence result is patently redundant, rather than offering some independent handle on semantic
equivalence. Yet various other candidates for the extra ingredient arguably face the same prob-
lem, only in a less direct manner. For instance, Putnam (1983) suggests that a formal equivalence
result is sufficient for semantic equivalence when conjoined with the non-formal requirement that
the result “preserves the relation of explanation and that the same phenomena are explained by both”
(39). But the explanations provided by some representational vehicle as interpreted on some oc-
casion of use depend, of course, on the vehicle’s content on that occasion. So Putnam’s proposal
avoids the charge of rendering the formal criterion at issue redundant only in a circumscribed
range of occasions of use: namely, those in which we know enough about the representational
vehicles’ contents on the occasion to know that the vehicles explain the same phenomena, yet
are still unsure whether the vehicles are semantically equivalent (that is, have the same contents
full-stop) on the occasion. How prevalent will such occasions be? Answering this question would
require going through the candidate contemporary accounts of explanation. So I will instead lean
on a second worry. But let me still note that the advocate of semantic inequivalence in some of
the disputed cases in the debate takes the representational vehicles at issue to describe, what at
least purport to be, altogether different conceptions of reality. For this reason, in such cases she
can also be expected to take the interpreted vehicles to offer explanations with radically different
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underlying structures so as to render them inequivalent on Putnam’s proposal. For this reason
Putnam’s proposal may offer little solace to those seeking to carve out a distinctive role for formal
equivalence results to play in adjudicating cases of semantic equivalence.
A second and more pressing worry for Putnam’s proposal turns on the familiar issue of what
the “phenomena” are.12 I shall rehearse the dialectic here in more detail in section 5, but let me
briefly spell out the issue. First, the phenomena must encompass more than just our experiences
themselves, for familiar reasons from the failure of the positivist program (for example, Putnam’s
proposal so-understood would render our familiar scientific accounts of the world semantically
equivalent to various skeptical or idealist accounts). And as mentioned above, proponents of for-
mal criteria generally explicitly allow for distinctions that cut finer than empirical equivalence.
The trouble is that proponents of semantic inequivalence in the cases of interest to proponents of
formal criteria might take their differing metaphysical pictures of the world to engender differ-
ences in the phenomena. For example, recall again the flash and matter-density interpretations
of some stochastic collapse formulation of a quantum theory. For the flash-theorist, the phenom-
ena might include a short-lived pointer-shaped object momentarily appearing in space. For the
matter-density theorist, the phenomena might instead include a certain field taking on high val-
ues across some pointer-shaped spatial region. What proponents of formal criteria need is some
principled (even if vague) intermediate level of content that includes and extends beyond our ex-
periences yet not far enough to also encompass these sorts of underlying metaphysical differences
that they wish to jettison. One such account generates what I call the physics deference proposal,
which I shall discuss in section 5. For now, let us just grant that such an intermediate level of
content can be carved out. The issue is that proponents of formal criteria would still need inde-
pendent motivation for the non-mathematical premise that a formal equivalence proof that also
preserves this intermediate level of content on some occasion suffices for semantic equivalence
on that occasion. Without such motivation, the strategy under discussion would just amount to
declaring the sought-after non-mathematical conclusions true by fiat. Yet now this extra (and to
my mind dubious) non-mathematical premise—the bridge between a formal equivalence result
that preserves the still amorphous intermediate level of content and semantic equivalence—is do-
ing the heavy-lifting in securing the non-mathematical conclusions about semantic equivalence.
So, although this proposal does not render formal criteria redundant, it does leave them with a
subsidiary role. And most importantly, I am not aware of any attempt by proponents of formal
criteria to defend the critical non-mathematical premise. So if some form of this proposal indeed
undergirds the substantial non-mathematical import that has been claimed on behalf of formal
criteria, such claims are premature.
12Putnam (1983, 39) is aware of this challenge. He offers a list of some candidate phenomena in the context of differ-
ent Lorentz frames in Special Relativity. Still, one wants some precise characterization of what counts as the phenomena
in general, otherwise we still would lack a general proposal for when a formal equivalence proof plus empirical equiv-
alence licenses a substantial non-mathematical conclusion like a claim of semantic equivalence. Moreover, the dialectic
I rehearse in this paragraph applies to Putnam’s specific examples (in particular, we still lack justification for the non-
mathematical premise that a formal equivalence result plus empirical equivalence plus explaining exactly these specific
candidate phenomena suffices for semantic equivalence).
13
The dialectic in the previous two paragraphs applies in general to any version of the reply
under discussion, which recall claims that formal equivalence results, plus empirical equivalence,
plus some extra ingredient suffice for semantic equivalence. The closer the extra ingredient comes
to semantic equivalence itself, the more the charge of redundancy becomes stark. Yet the closer
the extra ingredient comes to simply empirical equivalence, the more dubious the inference from
formal equivalence plus empirical equivalence plus the extra ingredient to semantic equivalence
becomes. As a result, the demand for some independent justification for the inference begins to
seem all the more urgent.13
A final potential reply to Sklar-style counterexamples for proponents of formal criteria is that
the sentential criteria are meant to apply only to first-order theories formulated in some privileged
vocabulary, of the sort we encounter when doing physics, rather than ordinary natural language
expressions like ‘lion’ or ‘tiger’. And as concerns such first-order theories, we cannot straightfor-
wardly appeal to the interpretations we in fact employ to generate counterexamples to sentential
criteria (most ordinary speakers never use the relevant vocabulary).
But this reply is also untenable. We must ask what the relevant interpretation of the vocabu-
lary at issue is, relative to which sentential criteria are supposed to bear on semantic equivalence.
The natural answer here is the interpretations employed by practicing physicists using the rel-
evant vocabulary. And now two problems arise. First, even relative to these interpretations, it
is dubious that the sentential criteria, even conjoined with empirical equivalence, will imply se-
mantic equivalence. Consider my example above concerning the absolute speed of the centre of
mass of the universe at a Newtonian world: those single-sentence theories arguably pass the priv-
ileged vocabulary restriction we are considering, and remain straightforward counterexamples to
any extant sentential criterion plus empirical equivalence implying semantic equivalence on the
relevant interpretations. Second, even bracketing that point, I will argue below against a similar
proposal for non-sentential criteria (what I call the physics deference proposal). Analogues of the
points I will make there can be made against the present attempt to restrict sentential criteria.
The upshot of this section is that the original counterexamples cannot be easily dismissed.
I conclude that sentential criteria seem to be straightforwardly bad guides to semantic equiva-
lence. I take this moral to cast doubt on any plausible and interesting view according to which
such criteria have non-mathematical significance, let alone bear on semantic equivalence. For,
any interpretations of the sentential theories at issue on which such a claim might be true will be
far-fetched and patently unrelated to the interpretations we in fact employ and care about.
Some proponents of formal criteria will not be too fazed by this upshot: as mentioned above,
13For example, the dialectic applies to the version of the reply sketched by Hudetz (2019, 48), that formal criteria are
sufficient for semantic equivalence when conjoined both with empirical equivalence and equivalence of “theoretical
content beyond the empirical (if there is any)” (48). Hudetz is admirably upfront that this sketch must be fleshed
out, but already we can see how the dialectic might go. If ‘theoretical content’ is just non-empirical content, then the
proposal amounts to declaring semantic equivalence sufficient for semantic equivalence, and the formal criteria are
rendered redundant. So ‘theoretical content’ plus ’empirical content’ must amount to the sort of intermediate-level
of content described above in the main text. One precisification of such content makes the strategy exactly akin to
the ‘physics deference proposal’ that I shall argue against in section 5. Still, however the notion is made precise, the
inference to semantic equivalence must be defended, not just assumed.
14
some have switched to the non-sentential category-theoretic criterion. Perhaps only non-sentential
criteria are meant to bear on semantic equivalence or have other significant non-mathematical im-
plications? And unlike with sentences, it is less clear what might be meant by ‘the interpretations
we in fact employ’ for the non-sentential representational vehicles often at issue in scientific prac-
tice. Indeed, I suspect some working on sentential criteria never viewed themselves as doing
anything but pure mathematics or logic.14 As I emphasized at the outset, I have no criticisms
of the purely mathematical upshots of work on formal criteria (results claiming that such-and-
such mathematical objects do or do not stand in so-and-so formal relation). Still, some work on
sentential criteria is premised on such criteria having significant non-mathematical implications,
in particular implying semantic equivalence (for example, the conclusions drawn by Barrett &
Halvorson (2017, 1060-61)). My conclusion in this section reveals this position to be untenable.
4 Two Formulations of General Relativity
I now turn to non-sentential criteria, focusing on the popular category-theoretic criterion. This
criterion will occupy us for the rest of the paper. In this section I will walk through a central
application of this criterion from the recent literature. We will use this test-case to explore whether
there is a defensible view according to which non-sentential criteria like the category-theoretic
criterion bear on semantic equivalence relative to some relevant interpretations. We shall see that
the most plausible option here requires adopting what I will call the physics deference proposal. I
will then argue against this proposal.
But let us start with the central example. The example concerns two mathematical formalisms
in which one can couch General Relativity (hereafter GR). It is a paradigm success-case in the eyes
of proponents of formal criteria, and moreover meant to cast doubt on the intelligibility of the
venerable metaphysical debate about whether there are spacetime points. It thus presents an ideal
example to use for our investigation of how one might vindicate non-sentential criteria having
significant non-mathematical implications.
The first formulation is the textbook treatment in terms of differential geometry. Here one be-
gins with a set of mathematical models, each of which contains a four-dimensional smooth mani-
fold of points, and various mathematical structures, called tensor fields, defined on this manifold
(including a Lorentzian metric field), all satisfying some equations. The second formulation in-
volves an algebraic structure called in Einstein algebra, due to Geroch (1972). Roughly, Einstein
algebras begin with every smooth real-valued function on some manifold of points, and then kick
away the manifold and understand these functions as algebraic objects in their own right. Ge-
roch then showed how to transform any tensor field from the textbook formulation in terms of
14This diagnosis strikes me as a plausible reading of Tsementzis (2017), and is suggested by the prominence of ex-
amples from pure mathematics in Halvorson (2012) and Barrett & Halvorson (2016a,b). (Though, as I will note shortly
in the main text, in other places these latter authors make claims that presuppose more than purely mathematical am-
bitions for sentential criteria.) The diagnosis is also suggested by work applying sentential criteria to different logics,
such as Wigglesworth (2017), Dewar (2018), and Woods (2018).
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differential geometry into an operation on this algebra of functions.15 Do not worry if this math-
ematics is unfamiliar. The important point is that, because Geroch explicitly rigged up Einstein
algebras to reproduce any general relativistic solution space couched in the textbook formalism of
differential geometry, unsurprisingly there is a strong structural resemblance between analogous
general relativistic solution spaces couched in the different formalisms. (Here by ‘analogous’ I
mean the solution spaces employ the same sorts of matter fields and impose the same constraints
on these fields.) This hunch has been made precise using the category-theoretic formal criterion
by Rosenstock, Barrett, and Weatherall (hereafter RBW), in their (2015).
Spelling out RBW’s mathematical result would require going through requisite background in
algebra and category theory. Fortunately, the informal idea behind what they show will suffice
for our purposes. A category consists of a collection of objects and a collection of arrows, which
are mappings from one object to another required to satisfy various axioms (see Mac Lane (1998,
ch.1) for the basic background). The first category at issue in RBW’s proof is the category of every
model in a solution space couched in the textbook formalism, each of which contains a manifold
of points with a metric defined on that manifold (and the arrows of the category are isometries).
The second category is the category of every model in the analogous solution space couched in
the Einstein algebra formalism, each of which contains an algebra of functions with the operation
that is the analogue of a metric defined on that algebra (and the arrows of the category are algebra
homomorphisms). Given the structural analogies between the formalisms, these two categories
resemble one another at some low-level of abstraction, and this is precisely what RBW (2015) show
(in particular that the categories are dual). Moreover, the methods they use extend to most general
relativistic solution spaces.
How is this mathematical result supposed to bear on whether there are spacetime points? The
reason is that some have claimed to be using the different formalisms to express conceptions of the
world that disagree over this question. The Einstein algebra formalism was first introduced into
foundational discussions of spacetime theories by Earman (1979, 1986, 1989), under the heading
of “Leibniz algebras”. Earman took himself to be using the Einstein algebra formalism to express
a metaphysics of spacetime that “eschews substantivalism in the form of spacetime points” (1989,
193), by contrast with how he was using the standard formalism. So Earman at least took himself
to have associated analogous solution spaces couched in the different formalisms with different
propositional contents: that is, to have effected an interpretation where these representational
vehicles are not semantically equivalent.16 I shall explore exactly how this process might work
15See Rynasiewicz (1992) and Rosenstock et al. (2015) for clear expositions of the formal details. These expositions
differ somewhat, but the differences need not concern us here.
16Earman hoped that the Einstein algebra inspired metaphysics would offer a metaphysics of spacetime that ad-
dresses the hole argument (see Earman & Norton (1987) for the classic statement of this argument, and Pooley (2013,
Section 7) and Norton (2015) for overviews of the many replies the argument has provoked). This motivation is widely
taken to have been undermined by Rynasiewicz (1992), who constructed an analogue of the hole argument in terms
of Einstein algebras. However, this issue, and the motivations for Earman’s position generally, will not bear on my
arguments. Similarly, Earman used ‘relationism’ to encompass more than just the negation of substantivalism. Hence,
he took his Einstein algebra inspired metaphysics to offer a novel third view, that vindicates certain aspects of both
substantivalism and relationism, rather than a relationist view. But nothing in what follows turns on the terminological
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below.
How is learning about RBW’s formal proof meant to bear on Earman’s proposal? Is there
a tenable view according to which the proof has non-mathematical significance, and moreover
somehow casts doubt on the intelligibility of the question of whether there are spacetime points?
RBW (2015) seem to think so; in their conclusion they write:
[Our result] establishes a sense in which the Einstein algebra formalism is equivalent
to the standard formalism for general relativity. This sense of equivalence captures
the idea that, on a natural standard of comparison, the two theories have precisely
the same mathematical structure—and thus, we claim, the same capacities to represent
physical situations ... Insofar as one wants to associate these two formalisms with “sub-
stantivalist” and “relationist”—or at least, non-substantivalist—approaches to space-
time, it seems that we have a kind of equivalence between different metaphysical views
about spatiotemporal structure. (315)
Let us now turn to how one might try to make good on this conclusion, and the more general doc-
trine that the category-theoretic formal criterion has significant non-mathematical implications.
As mentioned, for concreteness I shall stick with this one example throughout, and the attendant
debate over whether there are spacetime points. The example has the nice features of being rea-
sonably familiar, and perhaps avoiding more high-powered ideology at issue in other debates in
metaphysics (such as fundamentality).17 However, I want to emphasize that the points I make are
not wedded to this example. For instance, Weatherall (2015) proves a category-theoretic equiva-
lence result between the solution space of classical electromagnetism framed in terms of the Fara-
day tensor and the analogous solution space that employs the vector potential. I assume he would
take his result to have non-mathematical, and likely deflationary, implications for a debate over
whether there is a fundamental property corresponding to the vector potential. And I could make
analogues of my points below using this debate. Similarly for the related debate at issue in his
discussion concerning whether evidence for Newtonian theories supports believing spacetime to
be flat or curved. Readers with independent reasons to dislike the Einstein algebra example may
prefer to substitute one of these alternatives. Of course you may have independent reasons to be
skeptical of high-powered metaphysical ideology like fundamentality. But such skepticism that
stems from considerations other than a formal equivalence proof is irrelevant to the present di-
question of which views we label ‘relationist’.
17This latter issue is contentious. Some metaphysicians (for example Fine (2001) and Schaffer (2009)) argue that
most existence questions, whether ‘are there spacetime points?’ or ‘are there numbers?’, are trivially answered in the
affirmative. They then employ some additional ideology to carve what they see as more interesting questions, such as
‘are there numbers at the fundamental level?’, or ‘are there really numbers?’, and so on. Some have pushed this general
line about the substantivalism/relationism debate in particular, proposing that the debate cannot concern merely the
existence of spacetime points, which even relationists can grant (for different versions of this line, see Field (1984) and
North (2018)). I shall ignore this wrinkle in the main text, but incorporating it would not challenge my arguments.
The viability of the purely existential framing may also undermine some of RBW’s skepticism about the debate; at one
point they concede “of course, it remains open to the person who wants to give [the two formalisms] a metaphysical
significance to say that one of them is more fundamental than the other” (315), yet find their deflationary conclusion
“far more philosophically interesting” (316). Notice though that even skeptics about ‘fundamentality’ talk can pose the
question of whether there are spacetime points. Moreover, if my arguments succeed then their deflationary conclusion
is either ill-posed (see section 2) or else garners no support from their formal proof.
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alectic. Similarly for other reasons one may have for being skeptical of some metaphysical debate
that are independent of any formal equivalence proof.
5 Physics Deference
The passage from RBW just quoted above is one of the few places where we are given a hint as
to how a formal equivalence proof is meant bear on semantic equivalence. But notice that it is
not clear what is being claimed. The comment about “precisely the same mathematical structure”
is a property of the representational vehicles at issue understood as uninterpreted mathemati-
cal objects. How is this purely mathematical fact supposed to have implications for the non-
mathematical world? One might be tempted to put the moral of RBW’s formal proof as showing
that “the metaphysical view” associated with the textbook formalism is the same as “the meta-
physical view” associated with the Einstein algebra formalism; or similarly that “what is truly
represented” by the textbook formalism is also “what is truly represented” by the Einstein algebra
formalism. But we already saw the problems with such glosses in section 2. No formal object on its
own, like a solution space in any formalism, has some metaphysical view baked-in, or represents
the world as being any way whatsoever. In that section we also saw that the “same capacities to
represent physical situations” gloss that RBW offer in the passage cannot be taken at face-value.
Let me discuss this gloss further, given its prevalence.
As we saw, on the most straightforward reading of the gloss all representational vehicles con-
sidered on their own have the same “capacities to represent physical situations” because of triv-
ial semantic conventionality: namely, the capacity to represent just about any physical situation
whatsoever. How are we supposed to instead read the gloss so that it might apply non-trivially?
The works of those who use the gloss do not tell us. Moreover, it is unclear what precise charac-
terization of the gloss could serve the purposes of proponents of formal criteria: namely, render
plausible both the inference from a category-theoretic formal equivalence proof to ‘same capac-
ities to represent physical situations’, properly understood, and also the further inference from
this latter property to semantic equivalence relative to the interpretations operative in whatever
metaphysical debate is at issue. Some common qualifications of the gloss that I have encountered
state that a categorical equivalence proof reveals the vehicles at issue to have the same capacities
to represent physical situations faithfully or aptly or for some specific purpose. For any manner of
making such glosses precise, two features of the resulting relation must be defended: (i) that the
vehicles at issue in the disputed cases (which have been shown to be equivalent relative to some
formal category-theoretic criterion) thereby also stand in the relation, and (ii) that if two vehicles
stand in the relation, they are plausibly thereby also semantically equivalent relative to the inter-
pretations operative in whatever metaphysical debate is at issue. For every precisification of the
common qualifications of which I am aware, either (i) or (ii) becomes a non-starter.
To see a rough example, suppose we have some grip on the idea of an interpretation that
assigns contents to non-sentential representational vehicles in a manner where any content repre-
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sented must be in some sense mirrored in, or isomorphic to, the structural or syntactic properties
of the vehicle itself.18 Call such interpretations ‘picture-theory interpretations’; they are meant to
capture the intuition that a map, for example, might be in some sense intrinsically better suited to
represent certain properties of certain regions rather than contents of any other sort. I am skep-
tical that this idea can be made precise in a tenable manner, but we can bring out the problem
even conceding its cogency. With this notion in hand, here is one attempted precisification of
the claim that two non-sentential representational vehicles have “the same capacities to represent
physical situations” (perhaps intended by the ‘faithfully’ or ‘aptly’ qualifiers): there is no picture-
theory interpretation relative to which the vehicles have different contents. The trouble is that this
precisification flouts requirement (ii) from the previous paragraph, and hence cannot fulfill the
ambitions of proponents of formal criteria. For there is no reason to believe that picture-theory
interpretations, which can assign only very weak semantic contents, are those operative when
philosophers have asked the metaphysical questions at issue, such as whether there are spacetime
points.19 We shall see more on this theme in section 6 as well, and I suspect the same issue would
arise for other proposals of this kind.
What about the ‘for some specific purpose’ qualifier on “same capacities to represent physical
situations”? This brings us to the most initially plausible and common qualification that I have
encountered. In particular, here is what I suspect proponents of formal criteria will say at this
juncture. The qualifier ‘physical’ in the “same capacities to represent physical situations” gloss is
doing important work. RBW’s category-theoretic proof reveals the standard solution space and
the Einstein algebra solution space to be equally adequate for the purposes of doing physics; that is,
the proof about the two solution spaces’ mathematical structure somehow reveals that physicists
could use the solution spaces interchangeably. Let us say that two representational vehicles are
physically equivalent relative to some interpretations just in case the vehicles say the same thing
about any subject matter relevant to physics relative to those interpretations. As I shall expand
on shortly, it is far from clear what precisely this gloss might amount to; still, uncontroversially (i)
physical equivalence at least implies empirical equivalence, and (ii) things like the values of fields
or distribution of matter across spacetime will fall under the subject matter relevant to physics.
Assuming we have some handle on the notion of physical equivalence for now, the claim under
consideration is that RBW’s proof reveals the two solution spaces to be physically equivalent rel-
ative to the interpretations at issue when practicing physicists use these representational vehicles.
18Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I address this kind of proposal. There are various attempts to
spell out the very rough idea in a more plausible and precise manner in the vast literature on scientific modeling. For
some helpful surveys of the lay of the land here, see Suarez (2010) and Frigg & Nguyen (2016).
19For instance, even given my tenuous handle on the notion of a picture-theory interpretation, arguably such inter-
pretations can assign only contents that are purely qualitative (not about any particular objects). If so, such interpretations
can at best assign only contents like there are some spacetime points or other standing in such-and-such pattern of field values,
rather than contents describing which particular spacetime points have which field values. Yet the latter non-qualitative
contents are the ones required to even formulate the hole argument, which is perhaps the central argument that ani-
mates the contemporary substantivalism/relationism debate. (For references to some overviews of the hole argument,
see footnote 16.) In section 6 we’ll see that arguably even purely qualitative yet topic-specific contents of the sort
just described (such as purely qualitative contents about spacetime points) require going beyond the representational
resources of anything like a picture-theory interpretation.
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The second half of the passage quoted above, which moves from physical equivalence to collaps-
ing the substantivalism/relationism debate, embodies the further step to semantic equivalence.
Let us call the physics deference proposal the claim that, for every interpretation I, if two represen-
tational vehicles are physically equivalent relative to I then they are also semantically equivalent
relative to I. The physics deference proposal replaces the positivist’s empirical equivalence with
physical equivalence as sufficient for collapsing some distinction. Weatherall adopts something
like the proposal when he summarizes the vision underlying his interest in the category-theoretic
criterion as follows: “one allows that the distinctions that one can sensibly draw depends on the
structure of the world. And the best guide to understanding what those distinctions are will be
to study the properties of and relationships between our best physical theories” (2015, 1088). And
something in the vicinity of the physics deference proposal is arguably implicit in much of the
work on formal criteria.20 In this section and the next I shall argue that the physics deference
proposal is untenable. Yet this is the only remaining view that I am aware of that may vindi-
cate the striking non-mathematical conclusions drawn from extant formal equivalence proofs. I
will conclude that non-sentential criteria, like their sentential kin, are of limited non-mathematical
significance.
Let me stress first, though, that it is far from clear what ‘physical equivalence’, as it appears
in the proposal, even amounts to. The idea relies on the notion of saying the same thing about
any subject matter relevant to physics. We should allow that this subject matter need not be sim-
ply what actual physicists would claim to be relevant for their purposes, so the ‘deference’ at
issue involves some idealization. But what precisely does this subject matter consist in? It bet-
ter encompass more than just our observations, otherwise the physics deference proposal will be
as implausible as the discredited positivist criteria for semantic equivalence itself. And as men-
tioned in section 1.1, proponents of formal criteria explicitly want to allow that some intelligible
distinctions cut finer than empirical equivalence. However, what exactly is this notion of physical
equivalence that strengthens empirical equivalence yet falls short of encompassing the sorts of
distinctions metaphysics-oriented philosophers of physics debate about? It must not encompass
the latter distinctions, otherwise differences like those embodied in substantivalism and relation-
ism will engender physical inequivalence, rendering the physics deference proposal powerless to
support deflationary morals about such debates. Yet it is not clear that an intermediate line, even
a vague one, can be drawn that somehow siphons off the unwanted “metaphysical” content (re-
call the discussion of “intermediate” levels of content from section 3). The reason is that familiar
issues about the theory-ladenness of observation for empirical equivalence may recur at any such
20Additional evidence for this claim comes from the common practice amongst philosophers of science, especially
in the literature on dualities, of using ‘physical equivalence’ as a label for what I am calling ‘semantic equivalence’. If
my arguments against the physics deference proposal are successful then this terminology is highly misleading. For
relevant citations and discussion, see Butterfield (2018, 34). Compare also Putnam’s remark—when arguing for the
semantic equivalence of traditional continuous conceptions of spacetime and gunky conceptions (on which there are
no measure-zero points)—that “it can make no difference to physical explanation whether we treat space-time points as
‘real’ or as mere logical constructions” (1983, 43, emphasis original). The difficulties writing down physical laws in
gunky spacetimes suggests otherwise (see, for instance, Arntzenius & Hawthorne (2005) and Arntzenius (2008, 2012,
ch.4)).
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intermediate level of “physical” or “theoretical” content that strengthens empirical equivalence
but falls short of semantic equivalence itself. For example, some argue that the very notion of a
field must be understood as a property or relation distributed over a substantival spacetime (see
Field (1984)). If that view is correct then the distribution of field values across spacetime—a seem-
ingly uncontroversial example of the subject matter relevant to physics—would itself presuppose
a stance on the “metaphysical” debate between substantivalism and relationism. Appealing to
some notion of an ‘O-term’ or ‘non-structural term’ as providing the basis for an account of physi-
cal equivalence does not seem to offer any guidance here. It seems purely stipulative to deem, say,
‘spacetime point’ a T-term rather than O-term (or non-structural term), and then to argue on that
basis that the substantivalism/relationism debate is ill-posed, provided we are already allowing
for some O-terms that go beyond our experiences themselves.
Fortunately, I think we can bracket these concerns about whether proponents of formal cri-
teria can flesh out the physics deference proposal, and argue against the proposal even granting
that some workable notion of physical equivalence can be found. Similarly, because my main
arguments target the inference embodied in the physics deference proposal itself—from physical
equivalence to semantic equivalence—I am content to bracket another sort of concern one might
have. Notice that even granting the physics deference proposal, there still remains the prior ques-
tion of whether the category-theoretic criterion is in fact a good guide to physical equivalence
relative to the interpretations employed by practicing physicists. And one might complain that
the category-theoretic criterion itself allows one to generate different verdicts in most cases, de-
pending on how one couches the non-sentential representational vehicles at issue as categories
(in particular, which arrows one includes in the categories). Yet only one such verdict can in fact
track which vehicles practicing physicists use interchangeably. However, let us also set concerns
stemming from this front aside, despite my skepticism that there could be some metaphysically-
neutral way to determine which arrows to include in each category at issue. So let us grant that
extant formal criteria between non-sentential representational vehicles perfectly track some rigor-
ously characterized notion of physical equivalence relative to the interpretations at issue amongst
practicing physicists. What would follow?
Now extant formal equivalence proofs would have some non-mathematical implications: they
would illuminate physical equivalence, which however ultimately spelled out will concern the
non-mathematical world. Still, I do not think that proponents of formal criteria should take much
solace in this result, for two reasons.
First, notice that even if the physics deference proposal were true (that is, even if we could infer
semantic equivalence from physical equivalence), this non-mathematical premise, rather than any
formal equivalence proofs, would arguably be doing the central work in delivering the significant
non-mathematical conclusions about semantic equivalence. Given some putative metaphysical
debate, the question we must ask would be whether the distinction at issue concerns subject matter
relevant to physics. If not, the physics deference proposal dictates that we commit the debate to
the flames. Perhaps that is the view of proponents of formal criteria. But if it is, then they should
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focus their energies on defending the controversial physics deference proposal itself. All of the
work proving formal equivalence results would seem to be dialectically far less central than the
integral philosophical premise: it is the tendentious non-mathematical inference embodied in the
physics deference proposal, not any formal equivalence result, that opponents of the striking non-
mathematical conclusions about semantic equivalence will be inclined to challenge.
However, proponents of formal criteria will likely argue that our best guide to physical equiv-
alence are formal equivalence proofs (perhaps conjoined with empirical equivalence), and hence
that such proofs are still of central importance under the physics deference proposal. The trouble
is that, even if we were to view vindication of the physics deference proposal as a vindication
of formal equivalence results, we can nevertheless argue against the physics deference proposal
directly. For the proposal seems to deliver false verdicts in various cases. Let me walk through
one case, though many could be given. I will then argue in the next section that the cases in fact
at issue in the literature (including our central example of the two formalisms for GR) are not
importantly disanalogous from this one.
Philosophers of mind interested in panpsychism debate over whether microscopic objects are
phenomenally conscious.21 Now imagine the standard mathematical formalism for doing parti-
cle physics embellished in two different ways with a new expression referring to the property of
phenomenal consciousness: one formalism adds the claim that all fundamental particles are con-
scious, and the other adds the claim that no fundamental particles are conscious.22 To dramatize
this, you might imagine a physics community where writing your claims down in one font indi-
cates the panpsychist option, and in some other font the anti-panpsychist option, yet there is no
neutral formalism that physicists could use.23 These formalisms will be structurally analogous,
and can easily be contrived to be deemed equivalent by any formal criterion. And it is plausible
that the formalisms will be physically equivalent relative to the interpretations at issue when prac-
ticing physicists in this hypothetical community use these formalisms. For, however we cash out
the notion of physical equivalence, arguably the subject matter of physics will encompass things
like the trajectories taken by fundamental particles, their masses, and so on, not the further issue of
whether the particles also happen to be conscious. Indeed, whether there is something it is like to
be the fundamental particles seems orthogonal to the concerns of physicists.24 Yet notice that this
result of physical equivalence on its own is of limited non-mathematical significance: it merely
reflects what subject matter happens to concern physicists. The physics deference proposal now
21Or alternatively instantiate a “proto-consciousness” intrinsic property that grounds facts about which macroscopic
objects are phenomenally conscious. I shall ignore this wrinkle in the main text.
22Field-theoretically, this could be phrased in terms of whether certain excitations in various quantum fields (which
license our talk about a particle being present) also bring about phenomenal consciousness.
23We can also imagine a difference that affects the mathematical models the physicists use to express their views.
The argument in the main text does not turn on the precise details of how the difference gets formally expressed: many
options will still render the resulting vehicles equivalent relative to all extant formal criteria.
24In the main text I am bracketing certain fringe views where the truth of panpsychism would percolate up to spoil
physical equivalence; for instance, understandings of quantum mechanics where consciousness triggers wave-function
collapse. If even the truth of panpsychism were claimed to fall under the subject matter of physics, we could employ
numerous other examples instead (such as debates about whether there are moral properties, abstract objects, and so
on).
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recommends drawing the further inference from physical equivalence to semantic equivalence,
which would be of considerably more non-mathematical significance. Yet this further inference is
problematic: nobody should take the fact that physicists need not concern themselves with which
things are phenomenally conscious to challenge either the intelligibility of debates over which
things are conscious, or the overwhelmingly plausible claim that there is a contentful distinction
to be drawn between what is and is not phenomenally conscious. Thus the physics deference pro-
posal delivers the wrong result: we should all reject a wholesale deference to physical equivalence
as concerns the limits of intelligibility, on pain of having to collapse the distinction between what
is and is not phenomenally conscious (and much more besides).
Proponents of formal criteria will likely reply that the cases they are interested in are impor-
tantly disanalogous from this case and other analogous problem cases we might have employed
instead.25 That is, they will likely concede that the physics deference proposal recommends the
wrong verdict about phenomenal consciousness, but claim that this point does not challenge the
application of the proposal to the debates they are concerned with. To discuss this reply, I will
continue to focus on our central example of the substantivalism/relationism debate and the two
formulations of GR. The task facing proponents of formal criteria is the following: isolate some
salient difference between the debate over whether there are spacetime points, on the one hand,
and the debate over panpsychism, on the other, which renders plausible the claim that we should
follow the verdicts of the physics deference proposal concerning the former debate, despite the
proposal delivering false verdicts concerning the latter debate. Successfully completing this task
would block my argument. However, I will now argue that these cases are in fact not disanalogous
in any respect that bears on the applicability of the physics deference proposal.
6 Natural Language Glosses in Mathematical Physics
Notice that in the panpsychism case we appealed to a concept we understand independently of
the representational vehicles at issue in order to engender the vehicles’ semantic inequivalence,
despite their physical equivalence and any formal resemblance between them. In particular, given
that we antecedently understand the concept of phenomenal consciousness, we could straightfor-
wardly use it to ensure that the two representational vehicles fail to be semantically equivalent
even relative to the interpretations adopted by practicing physicists, by stating that one but not
the other is being used to describe all fundamental particles as being phenomenally conscious.
Thus the disanalogy proponents of formal criteria must press is that we lack an analogous
independent understanding of the concept of a spacetime point. Otherwise, we could straightfor-
wardly use it to express the distinction between a world containing spacetime points and a world
containing none, and thereby effect an interpretation of the different solution spaces according to
25If they were instead to bite the bullet about this case and every other analogous case, I would then lean more on
the concerns that I raised but set aside above: (i) the lack of a principled and metaphysically-neutral characterization
of physical equivalence, and (ii) the lack of a principled and metaphysically-neutral procedure for couching whatever
non-sentential representational vehicles are at issue as categories.
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which one but not the other represents each nomic possibility as containing spacetime points. We
would then have a failure of semantic equivalence, exactly as in the panpsychism case. This may
be what Earman took himself to be doing when he said that he was using the Einstein algebra
formalism to represent a metaphysics of spacetime that “eschews substantivalism in the form of
spacetime points” (1989, 193). From this dialectical position, the physical equivalence of the two
representational vehicles, and hence RBW’s formal proof of their structural resemblance, would
seem completely beside the point as concerns their semantic equivalence.
How might proponents of formal criteria argue that our understanding of the concept of a
spacetime point is importantly different from our understanding of phenomenal consciousness?
If RBW’s proof is to be relevant, the position must somehow tether our understanding of the con-
cept of a spacetime point to how physicists use the textbook differential geometry formalism (with
its manifold of points) rather than other formalisms (like the Einstein algebra formalism). The idea
would then continue that our evidence for the intelligibility of the substantivalism/relationism de-
bate is therefore premised on practicing physicists drawing a distinction between the differential
geometry solution space and solution spaces in other formalisms. If that were right, then once we
learn that these representational vehicles are physically equivalent (relative to the interpretations
practicing physicists employ), we plausibly ought to jettison our belief that we understand what
it is to be a spacetime point, and with it our belief in a contentful substantivalism/relationism
debate. The general proposal here is as follows: restrict the physics deference proposal to in-
terpretations of representational vehicles that are effected using only concepts analogous to our
concept of a spacetime point if the claims in this paragraph are correct. That is, the general pro-
posal is that we should infer semantic equivalence from physical equivalence only in cases where
we have appealed to no antecedently understood concepts. This restricted physics deference proposal
excludes the panpsychism case and the other analogous cases we might have employed, thereby
dodging my arguments.
But does the restricted physics deference proposal allow proponents of formal criteria to con-
tinue to maintain that their proofs support deflationary positions about certain debates in the
metaphysics of physics, or have other substantial non-mathematical implications? Let me confess
that I have a tenuous grip on what exactly is being claimed here on behalf of the concept of a space-
time point. We are all familiar with talk about concepts “given by their role in a theory.” Yet notice
that in the present setting ‘theory’ talk must somehow encompass both a particular mathematical
formalism as well as some semantic content, otherwise an equivalence proof between analogous
solution spaces in different formalisms cannot purport to undermine our claim to understand the
relevant concepts. Thus the position being articulated concerning our concept of a spacetime point
cannot be modeled straightforwardly on the standard Ramsey sentence method of Lewis (1970),
which is not tethered to any mathematical formalism. Notice also that uncontroversially the claim
that must be made here on behalf of the concept of a spacetime point would be a very particular se-
mantic doctrine. Yet proponents of formal criteria have never tried to argue for any such doctrine.
Thus, even bracketing my arguments to come, I regard unearthing this potential presupposition
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of the view that formal criteria have non-mathematical implications as an important result in its
own right, and one which may help to focus the debate over the implications of formal criteria on
the central philosophical issues moving forward.
Nevertheless, even given a tenuous understanding of what the restricted physics deference
proposal is claiming, we can argue that the proposal does not in fact deliver the desired non-
mathematical implications. The reason is that the debates in the metaphysics of physics at issue
generally involve concepts that are importantly analogous to those we antecedently understand,
like phenomenal consciousness. Hence, this restricted physics deference proposal will not rec-
ommend an inference to semantic equivalence even in the desired cases, but will instead exclude
them along with the problematic panpsychism case. I shall offer three arguments in defense of
this claim, continuing to focus on our central example of the concept of a spacetime point and the
substantivalism/relationism debate. Each argument purports to show that our understanding of
the concept of a spacetime point never depended on deference to whether practicing physicists
draw a certain distinction with a particular formalism. I should stress, though, that analogues
of my arguments carry over to the other debates in the metaphysics of physics we might have
employed instead.
First, notice that an analogue of the substantivalism/relationism debate in the context of GR
goes back at least to Newton and Leibniz, who debated about whether there are spatial and tem-
poral points in pre-relativistic physics well before the advent of differential geometry. Arguably
a close analogue of the debate can even be found in pre-Socratic discussions about the reality
of unoccupied space (“the void”); and these discussions of course occurred significantly before
the advent of contemporary physics or mathematics. These historical precedents should make us
very uneasy about claims that our concept of a spacetime point is somehow tethered to physi-
cists marking out certain distinctions using the textbook formulation of GR. These precedents for
the contemporary debate suggest that whether evidence for some physical phenomena supports
believing that there are things like spacetime points is not some esoteric concern of recent meta-
physics.
Second, the concept of a spacetime point arguably has a well-defined role independent of any
particular physics or mathematics, and is tied to some of our core concepts like that of an object.
For instance, spacetime points might be understood as those objects that material objects (like
tables, chairs, or particles) are located at, or those objects that are the bearers of field values, or
those objects that instantiate fundamental spatiotemporal properties and relations (which may in
turn be a primitive concept, or defined via a connection to dynamical laws and the concept of an
inertial trajectory). The details are up for debate, but the point again is that our understanding of
the concept does not seem wedded to which distinctions practicing physicists draw or somehow
to the textbook differential geometry formalism for GR.
Finally, my main argument stems from the foundational issues mentioned towards the outset.
As I have emphasized throughout, a mathematical object, like some general relativistic solution
space in the textbook differential geometry formalism, is on its own just a piece of mathematics,
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which does not represent the world as being any way whatsoever. Investigate the properties of
some such object as much as one likes; explore all of the mathematical mappings it does or does not
stand in to other uninterpreted mathematical objects; and still no proposition or semantic content
will somehow come out, let alone the contentful distinction between a world having or lacking
spacetime points. Rather, even physicists must somehow use other antecedently interpreted rep-
resentational vehicles to endow uninterpreted mathematical objects with semantic content in the
first place; for instance, natural language glosses on the mathematics, where these glosses employ
concepts the physicists antecedently understand. Notice that this was also exactly our diagnosis
of how the failure of semantic equivalence arose in the panpsychism case.
This method of proceeding is apparent in any physics textbook. For example, notice that no
textbook on GR just displays a general relativistic solution space (understood as an uninterpreted
mathematical object) and then expects the reader to arrive at some semantic content encoding
what a world where GR is true happens to be like. Rather, the mathematics at issue when pre-
senting GR (or any other physics) is qualified with natural language glosses, like ‘representing
spacetime’, ‘representing mass density’, and so on, which serve to characterize what the mathe-
matics is being used to represent. Crucially, if this method is to succeed then these natural lan-
guage concepts must be at least partially understood independently of the mathematics at issue.
We see, then, that even physicists must take for granted some antecedent understanding of the
concept of a spacetime point, given that they employ this concept in characterizing what they
are using the formalism of GR to represent. This general mode of proceeding is also apparent
throughout the metaphysics of physics: diverging views in some debate often arise by qualifying
one and the same mathematical object with different natural language glosses (recall the flash and
matter-density example). It is generally assumed that we have an antecedent understanding of
the distinctions involved in these glosses (such as between an object and a property, a law and a
non-law, and so on).26
It is tempting, albeit mistaken, to regard the conceptions of reality inspired by our best physics
as somehow arising entirely from how physicists use certain mathematical formalisms, with no
need for contributions from the rest of our conceptual repertoire, including those embodied in
natural language. And I think this mistaken thought plausibly underlies the guiding vision of
proponents of formal criteria of equivalence, where a purely formal relation (even conjoined with
empirical or physical equivalence) could have significant non-mathematical implications, and in
particular illuminate semantic equivalence. Once we appreciate the importance of antecedently
interpreted representational vehicles, like natural language glosses, in arriving at a conception
26Precedents for views in the spirit of the one I am sketching here can be found in Sklar (1980)—who emphasizes the
importance of semantic connections to ordinary concepts (like that of an object) via analogies when doing science—and
also in Maudlin (2018)—who emphasizes the importance of what he calls a “commentary” to supplement any given
mathematical formalism in order to arrive at some semantic content. A similar moral has also been drawn in the
vast literature on scientific modeling, where it is now widely recognized that features beyond a mathematical model
itself—such as the intentions and natural language glosses of the scientist using the model—are integral to effecting an
interpretation of the model. For some helpful overviews of this literature see the works cited in footnote 18. Nguyen
(2017) applies this moral about scientific modeling to the debate over theoretical equivalence, supporting the extant
critiques mentioned in section 2 (in particular, the critiques of Sklar (1982) and Coffey (2014)).
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of reality from our best physics, the failure of formal criteria to bear on semantic equivalence
is unsurprising. For such criteria by their nature ignore these integral components in the pre-
sentations of our best physics, instead considering only the mathematics we use to express our
best physics. Supplementing a formal criterion with empirical or physical equivalence does not
remedy the problem, given that the distinctions we can draw with these additional representa-
tional resources, like natural language glosses, can and generally do cut finer than empirical and
even physical equivalence.27 Of course these brief remarks are only the beginning of a complete
story about how mathematical physics works: we still face the question of how some of these
antecedently understood concepts come to have content in the first place, whether our concept
of space, time, object, and so on. However, this is just the familiar and perennial problem of
metasemantics, which is everyone’s problem, and the subject of considerable ongoing investi-
gation. Given that mathematical physics works, and natural language glosses involving these
concepts play an important role in its operation, the problem must have some solution.28
7 Taking Stock
We have been searching for a defensible view according to which formal criteria of equivalence,
whether sentential or non-sentential, might have significant non-mathematical implications, in
particular illuminating semantic equivalence. Our investigation suggests that there is no such
view to be found, thereby supporting the moral that formal criteria do not bear on which distinc-
tions are intelligible, nor somehow impugn the kinds of debates that occupy metaphysics-oriented
philosophers of physics. Perhaps there is some such view that I have missed, though our investi-
gation does not recommend optimism on this score. Moreover, I think we can confidently claim
that, if there is such a view, spelling it out precisely and defending it will be a highly non-trivial
task, one bound up with controversial issues in other branches of philosophy. Proponents of for-
mal criteria who want to maintain that their results have significant implications beyond pure
mathematics should make explicit which philosophical doctrines they take to support this stance,
and try to defend such controversial doctrines directly. If nothing else, I hope my discussion spurs
proponents of formal criteria to shift some of their focus from proving formal equivalence results
27Category-theoretic criteria allow some additional freedom, stemming from the choice of arrows when couching
some mathematical physics in category-theoretic terms. However, this point also does not challenge the moral in the
main text. The reason is that the distinctions we can draw with additional representational resources also extend beyond
those we can draw by different choices of arrows when deciding on a category-theoretic representation, granting the
standard contentful significance of such arrows as erasing distinctions between possibilities. This fact also diminishes
the interest of the claims made on behalf of the non-mathematical significance of category-theoretic criteria by Barrett
(2019) and Weatherall (2019), to the effect that we can use different choices of arrows to diagnose ambiguities in how
some mathematical physics can be used to represent the world: restricting this claim to any natural class of relevant
interpretations (as we must, recall section 2), these ambiguities can involve distinctions that also cut finer than choosing
which differences between possibilities wash out when testing for equivalence, which is what a category’s arrows are
used to represent.
28For related remarks about the importance of more general metasemantical issues in the philosophy of language and
mind to questions about how we use mathematical objects to represent the world when doing science, see Callender &
Cohen (2006).
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to this foundational task, which is integral to the philosophical interest of formal criteria yet has
been relatively neglected.29
29Thanks most of all to Cian Dorr and Ben Holguín, for extremely helpful comments and discussion at every stage
of the paper’s development. Many thanks also to David Albert, Thomas Barrett, Dave Chalmers, Hartry Field, and
Tim Maudlin, for comments and discussion that led to significant improvements. Finally, for very helpful comments
and discussion about this material, thanks to Kevin Coffey, Michael Strevens, Brad Weslake, the anonymous referees,
as well as the audiences at NYU’s work in progress seminar and Caltech’s philosophy of physics reading group.
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